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Sprumont, Yves

Full Professor

Contact:

  • Telephone 514-343-2403 Pav. PAV.M.CARON-L.GROULX-3200 J.B. \ Ext. C6024

Website

Presentation

    Yves Sprumont received his Ph.D. in economics from Virginia Tech in 1990. He is currently a professor at the University of Montreal. He is a charter member of the Game Theory Society and a fellow of the Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory. He received the John Rae Prize of the Canadian Economic Association in 2012 and the Marcel Dagenais Prize of the Société Canadienne de Science Économique in 2015. His research has been regularly supported by grants from the federal and provincial funding agencies. He has written over 50 peer-reviewed articles, served as an associate editor of Games and Economic Behavior, Social Choice and Welfare and Mathematical Social Sciences, and is currently on the editorial board of the Journal of Economic Theory and Theoretical Economics.

    His research is devoted to the positive and normative analysis of collective decision procedures. His positive work has helped identify the testable restrictions of key game-theoretic equilibrium concepts such as Nash equilibrium and backward induction. On the normative side, he made contributions to the study of egalitarianism, utilitarianism, and Nash welfarism. He also contributed to the analysis of fair and strategically robust mechanisms in various economic problems such as the allocation of commodities with satiated preferences, fair division in classical economies, cost sharing, the provision of public goods, and collective choice under uncertainty. He is not interested in Covid 19.

Areas of expertise

Publications

Strategyproof choice of social acts (with E. Bahel), American Economic Review 110 (2020), 596-627.

Every choice function is backwards-induction rationalizable (with W. Bossert), Econometrica 81 (2013), 2521-2534.

An axiomatization of the serial cost-sharing method, Econometrica 78 (2010), 1711-1748.

On the discrete version of the Aumann-Shapley cost-sharing method, Econometrica 73 (2005), 1693-1712. 

Fair production and allocation of an excludable nonrival good (with F. Maniquet), Econometrica 72 (2004), 627-640.

The division problem with single-peaked preferences: a characterization of the uniform allocation rule, Econometrica 59 (1991), 509-519.